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I.  Introduction 
 
In recent years there have been a number of strands in economic literature that have 
related aspects of the institutional environment to financial and economic 
development, both directly and indirectly.  This has been made possible by the 
development by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) of 
measures of creditor protection laws, investor protection laws and the quality of law 
enforcement which they use to investigate a variety of issues.  A major theme of their 
work is the consistent influence of legal families (common law, French civil code, 
German civil code, Scandinavian) on aspects of the financial and corporate systems of 
countries.  The investor and creditor protection variables developed in this work allow 
the influence of differences in such laws on various aspects of the financial and 
corporate sectors to be analysed.   
 
A number of authors have used these measures of legal institutions in work which 
relates growth or development to the existence of a healthy financial sector which is 
in turn a function of legal institutions.  This has become known as the ‘Law and 
Finance’ literature.  King and Levine (1993), Levine (1999), Levine and Zervos 
(1998) and Levine (2003) demonstrate the relationship between growth and various 
measures of the financial sector.  Levine (1999) extends this to show that the 
measures of financial sector development are themselves functions of creditor 
protection laws, the risk of government contract modification and accounting 
regulations.  The latter are however seen primarily as instrumental variables to 
overcome the endogeneity of the financial sector variables.  Levine (2003) extends 
this to an analysis of stock-market development and shareholders' rights.  Azfar, 
Matheson and Olson (1999) as part of a programme on 'market augmenting 
government' developed the concept of 'Market-Mobilised Capital' (MMC) which they 
claim plays a central role in economic growth.  MMC is the sum of stocks of debt and 
equity as a proportion of GDP.  Azfar and Matheson (2003) in a development of this 
work deal with issues of endogenity and causality by the use of measures of investor 
protection, creditor protection and enforcement of laws as instruments on market 
mobilised capital. 
 
The present paper seeks to extend the work reported in Azfar and Matheson (2003) on 
the significance of market mobilised capital for growth by examining more closely the 
role played by investor and creditor protection laws and their enforcement on the 
components of market mobilised capital and thus growth. 
 
 
II. Laws and their Enforcement 
The literature referred to above has sought to explain the relationship between an 
economy's growth and its institutional structure.  Institutional structure has been 
proxied in this literature by various indices of laws protecting the property rights of 
creditors and investors and the degree to which laws are enforced in each country.  
The focus has been the relationship between growth and the development of the 
financial sector of the economy.  It is the development of the financial sector which is 
seen to be a function of the institutional structure.  A legal system which protects 
creditors and investors and within which the rule of law is enforced, it is argued, 
fosters a healthy financial sector which provides the resources for economic growth. 
Since much of the empirical work discussed above is essentially concerned with 
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identifying instruments to overcome the endogenous nature of a key variable in 
determining economic growth it treats the legal and enforcement variables in a fairly 
ad hoc manner.  For example, Azfar and Matheson (2003) treat their regressions on 
the determinants of bank lending and market capitalisation largely as a means of 
screening for relevant instruments for the variable ‘market-mobilized capital’ in their 
growth equation.  Nevertheless, this does not stop authors from reaching fairly strong 
policy conclusions about the role of improvements in investor and creditor protection 
laws on economic growth: 
 In this paper we showed that a country’s collateral and corporate laws….have 
significant effects on economic growth…Our findings improve on earlier work by 
showing that statutory commercial law and financial market development have a direct 
effect on economic growth even after controlling for law enforcement…..This is a 
finding of some policy relevance.  Much second-generation reform has concentrated on 
the reform of commercial laws, and our findings suggest that this can have a large 
economic payoff.  (Azfar and Matheson, 2003, pp369,370) 
 
In the present paper more attention is paid to the relationship between legal rules and 
their enforcement.  It is important to do this in order to see whether there is any 
leverage for policymakers in using legal instruments to improve economic growth.  If, 
for example, certain legal rules were found to be important for developing the 
financial sector, policy makers might be interested in adopting them to facilitate the 
growth of that sector and, in the long run, the economy as a whole.  However, if these 
rules are only effective in a legal system with very high levels of enforcement their 
introduction to a country where enforcement is low would be ineffective.  None of the 
studies cited above allow for such interaction between enforcement and specific laws. 
They have been considered by others concerned with the need of effectively enforcing 
other types of rules.  However, these papers deal with different issues, such as the rate 
of bankruptcies (Claessens et al. (1999)), currency depreciation and change in the 
stock market in emerging markets after the Asian crisis (Johnson et al. (2000)) and 
the number of mergers and acquisitions (Rossi and Volpin (2001)). With the only 
exception being the changes in the stock market value, the interaction between 
commercial rules and enforcement tends to be positive and significant in explaining 
the behaviour of these variables.   
 
The significance of the interaction of enforcement with specific legal rules governing 
investor and creditor protection is tested below.  In order to bring out clearly the 
difference which this approach makes, the data used is the same as that used by Azfar 
and Matheson (2003).   
 
Azfar and Matheson (2003) develop the concept of Market Mobilised Capital (MMC) 
as a measure of financial market development.  MMC is the sum of the stock of credit 
by commercial and deposit-taking banks to the private sector divided by GDP (BYP) 
and the average value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by 
GDP (MCAP).  They show that the size of MMC is determined by, inter alia, creditor 
and investor protection laws and an index of the extent to which contracts are 
protected and the rule of law is effective.  Essentially these institutional variables are 
used as instrumental variables in regressions in which growth is shown to be 
determined by, among other things, MMC.  
 
The variables used by Azfar and Matheson (2003) include the financial sector 
variables used in Levine and Zervos (1998) and legal rule variables used in La Porta 
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et al. (1998).  These legal rules have been identified previously as protecting 
shareholders’ rights on the one hand and creditors’ rights on the other.  In the case of 
shareholders’ rights they protect minority shareholders against the expropriation of 
their investment by managers or majority shareholders.  Without the protection of 
such laws investment in the stock market will be discouraged and this potential 
vehicle for supporting economic growth inhibited.  In the case of creditor protection 
they protect creditors’ (particularly banks’) interest in the assets of defaulting debtors.   
 
The legal rules taken to protect shareholders are: 
1. Those guaranteeing one share one vote to shareholders.   
2. Those allowing shareholders to vote by proxy.   
3. Those protecting the interests of minority shareholders.   
4. Those requiring a mandatory dividend to be paid to shareholders.   
 
It is argued by Azfar and Matheson (2003) that the first three of these rules enhance 
stock market capitalisation but the mandatory dividend rule reduces expansion of 
firms through retained earnings and therefore will reduce stock market capitalisation.   
A variable CORPL is created by aggregating these variables.  Its value rises by one 
for each of the first three which are present.  Where a dividend is mandatory the value 
of CORPL is reduced by 0.N where N is the percentage of mandatory dividend. 
 
The legal rules seen as affecting creditors are: 
1. Protection of secured lenders who are paid first in the distribution of proceeds 
from the sale of a bankrupt firm. 
2. Laws prohibiting the sale of assets when an application is filed for reorganisation 
of a bankrupt firm.  Such a rule is seen in the literature as antithetic to the interests 
of secured lenders and thus a negative influence on lending. 
3. Laws which allow firms in administration pending reorganisation to remain under 
the control of existing management.  Again such a rule is seen to be against the 
interests of secured creditors. 
 
Azfar and Matheson (2003), following others in the literature, argue that the presence 
of the first type of creditor protection law enhances bank lending while the presence 
of the other two detracts from bank lending.  Thus a variable COLLAW is created 
which rises by one in the presence of the protection of secured lenders but which fall 
by one for the presence of each of the other two.  Thus its value can range from -2 to 
+1. 
 
A number of the papers referred to above have stressed the importance of the rule of 
law for the development of financial and other markets.  Azfar and Matheson (2003), 
along with other authors, argue that the enforcement of property rights and protection 
against state repudiation of contracts is important from the point of view of market 
development.  They use the average of the 'Rule of law' index and the risk of contract 
repudiation index defined by La Porta et al. (1998).  It takes values from zero to ten.  
In the regressions in the present paper this is the variable ENFORCE.   
 
Azfar and Matheson (2003) run a number of regressions to find variables which may 
be used as instruments for MMC.  They run preliminary regressions on the 
determinants of BPY and MCAP which are found to be ENFORCE and respectively 
CORPL and COLLAW.  However, in their final growth regressions they use all the 
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components of COLLAW and CORPL together with a set of control variables and 
ENFORCE as instruments for MMC.  Below we repeat some of these regressions 
using the same data but allowing for the interaction of ENFORCE and the investor 
and creditor protection variables.  We find that the regressions reported by Azfar and 
Matheson (2003) imply the imposition of invalid restrictions on one of these more 
general equations.  Furthermore, the imposition of valid restrictions suggests 
importantly different policy prescriptions for some countries than those suggested by 
Azfar and Matheson 2003).  
 
Table 1 presents the results on the determinants of Market Capitalisation (MCAP).  
Column (1) shows the result of regressing MCAP on ENFORCE and CORPL as done 
by Azfar and Matheson (2003).  Column (2) shows the results of a more general 
specification which includes as additional explanatory variables: 
ENF2, the square of ENFORCE 
ENFCORP, the product of ENFORCE and CORPL 
ENSQCOR, the product of ENF2 and CORPL 
and control variables used by Azfar and Matheson (2003) in later regressions: 
TRDY, a measure of the country’s integration in international trade 
LSEC, logarithm of mean years of secondary school education for the country 
LRGDP, logarithm of GDP of the country in 1976   
REVCOUP, number of revolutions and coups in the country during the period 
This general specification permits the testing of alternative functional forms. 
 
The validity of the exclusion restrictions on (2) implied by regression (1) are tested by 
means of an F test and Likelihood Ratio test on the joint restrictions, the values of 
which are shown at the foot of column (1).  In both cases the restrictions are rejected. 
 
An alternative set of exclusion restrictions are imposed in the regression reported in 
column (3) and their joint validity tested by an F test and Likelihood Ratio test.  This 
set of restrictions can be validly imposed.  This regression result suggests that not 
only does a country’s degree of integration in international trade influence the size of 
its stock market capitalisation but also that the latter is determined by the interaction 
of ENFORCE and CORPL.  Thus the influence which investor protection laws have 
on stock market capitalisation depends on the extent to which a country’s laws are 
enforced.  This is, perhaps, an unsurprising result which, nevertheless, has significant 
implications for policies to promote the growth of stock markets and which has not 
been identified previously.   
 
The estimated coefficients suggest also that at low levels of enforcement the 
introduction of investor protection laws may even be counterproductive.  The 
estimated coefficients in column (3) of Table 1 imply that at levels of ENFORCE 
below 4.46 ‘improving’ investor protection laws will result in a reduction in stock 
market capitalisation.  Four countries in the data set fall in this range (Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Zimbabwe) and one is just marginally above it (Colombia).  
Furthermore, the impact of ENFORCE reaches its maximum when it is 8.36.  Most 
developed countries in the sample together with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan 
are above this level.  The exceptions among developed countries are Spain and 
Greece.  
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Table 1:Determinants of MCAP 
Number of obs      39       39     39 
F              18.81(2,36)    18.75(9,29) 45.49)(4,34) 
Prob > F       0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared      0.5110   0.8533 0.8426 
Adj R-squared  0.4838   0.8078 0.8240 
Root MSE   .21648   .13209 .12639 
 
    
  Variable       Coef.    Coef.   Coef. 
                 Std. Err  Std. Err  Std Err 
 
   Trdy                   .2760601***   .2990475*** 
                                .0504945   .0451281 
   lrgdp       -.0149016   
 .0435472   
    lsec       -.0202511   
 .085259    
 revcoup       -.0199917   
 .1343718   
 enforce         .040921*   -.2598925   
                  .0169574      .2336138   
    enf2         .0189883   
 .0158462   
   corpl    .2120403***  -1.375144* -.7261641** 
                  .0403538      .560926  .2641649 
 enfcorp         .4205908*  .2220352** 
 .1700472  .0800571 
ensqcorp       -.0271325* -.0132856* 
 .0119067  .0056691 
   _cons      -.2213587     .996711 -.0133091 
                   .1329005     .7801644  .0347228 
Tests of Restrictions 
F test              9.67(7,29)               0.43(5,29)     
Probability         0.0000                 0.8269        
LR test chi2       46.96(r)
Probability         0.0000             0.7365      
(7)                2.76(5)       
  Notes:     *  significant at 5% level on a two tailed test 
                **  significant at 1% level on a two tailed test 
              *** significant at 0.1% level on a two tailed test 
 
 
These results suggest that the countries in this sample fall into four groups as far as 
policies to promote stock market capitalisation are concerned: 
1. Those for which the priority should be improvement in the enforcement of the 
‘Rule of Law’ (Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Zimbabwe and possibly 
Colombia); 
2. Those for which only improvements in investor protection laws can increase 
stock market capitalisation (Portugal, Singapore, Italy, Taiwan, France, United 
Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, USA, Finland, New Zealand, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria and Norway); 
3. Hong Kong for which CORPL is at its maximum and where ENFORCE is 
greater than 8.36; 
4. Those for which improvements in both enforcement and investor protection 
would lead to greater stock market capitalisation (Indonesia, Egypt, Argentina, 
India, Turkey, Mexico, Israel, Brazil, Greece, Chile, Thailand, Korea, 
Malaysia and Spain). 
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 Table 2 presents the results for regressions on the determinants of bank lending 
(BPY).  Column (1) shows Azfar and Matheson’s results, while column (2) shows the 
results for a more general set of regressors as in Table 1.  However here COLLAW 
and its interaction with ENFORCE (ENFCOLL) and ENF2 (ENSQCOLL) are 
substituted for CORPL, ENFCORP and ENSQCORP.  In this case both the F test and 
the Likelihood Ratio test suggest that the restrictions imposed by Azfar and Matheson 
(2003) are valid.  Thus improvements in either enforcement or creditor protection are 
seen to result in an increase in bank lending. 
 
    Table 2: Determinants of BPY 
Number of obs       39            39 
F          20.40          5.31       (2,36) (9,29)
Prob > F        0.0000           0.0003 
R-squared       0.5313           0.6225 
Adj R-squared   0.5053           0.5053 
Root MSE        0.31902           0.319 
 
   Variable     Coef.           Coef.           
              Std. Err         Std. Err 
 
    trdy                     .2017589 
                             .12309  
   lrgdp                    -.0349005 
                             .1105645 
    lsec                     .1966786 
                             .2387147 
 revcoup                     .567784 
                             .3949553 
 enforce      .1574683***    .4686862 
              .0250066       .3522545 
    enf2                    -.0222267  
                             .0232423 
  collaw      .095693        .7033928 
              .0488992      1.028371 
 enfcoll                    -.1532877 
                             .3060701 
ensqcoll                     .0084918 
                             .0213261 
    cons     -.3396885     -2.024821 
              .1937461      1.184976  
Tests of Restrictions 
F test                        1.00(7,29)
Probability                   0.4508 
LR test chi2(r)                        8.44(7) 
Probability                   0.2955 
 
 
What are the implications for growth of these results?  Following Azfar and Matheson 
(2003) this is done by running an Instrumental Variables regression of the 
determinants of average growth per capita for the period 1976-93 (GRYP).  However, 
here we treat this equation explicitly as part of a system of three equations being 
estimated equation by equation.  The other equations of the system are equation (3) in 
Table 1 and equation (2) in table 3 showing the determinants of MCAP and BPY 
respectively. Furthermore, initially these two variables are included in the IV 
estimation rather than MMC. The explanatory variables used in the growth regression 
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are the control variables used in the earlier unrestricted regressions together with 
MCAP and BPY which are clearly endogenous. The instruments used for the 
endogenous variables are those in the final OLS regressions for the two variables 
together with the exogenous (control) variables. 
 
      Table 3: IV Estimates of Determinants of GRYP  
Number of obs       39   39 
F           6.68   12.83       (6,32)  (4,34) 
Prob > F        0.0001     0.0000 
R-squared       0.4502     0.5542 
Adj R-squared   0.3471     0.5017 
Root MSE        1.7065     1.4908 
 
 
 variables       Coef.        Coeff. 
         Std. Err.    Std. Err. 
 
     bpy       4.270851*      
               1.824703     
    mcap       1.52286    
               1.941244    
    mmc      2.707213*** 
        .553866 
    trdy       -.0260805    
               1.005617    
   lrgdp      -2.06361***      -1.956633*** 
                .4273683   .3578195 
    lsec       1.811794    2.127694** 
                .9724138    .7770075 
 revcoup      -2.824543* -2.913149** 
               1.171309   1.013731 
    cons       8.47784**  7.294475*** 
               2.553819   1.759189 
Test of Restrictions: 
F           0.45(2,32)
Prob > F        0.6394 
 
Endogenous:   bpy mcap mmc. 
Instruments:  enforce collaw corpl enfcorp  
              ensqcorp trdy + trdy lrgdp lsec 
              revcoup. 
 
 
 
 
The results of this unrestricted IV regression are presented in column (1) of Table 3. 
Two restrictions are jointly tested. The first is that the coefficients on MCAP and BPY 
can be constrained to be equal. This is actually a test of whether MMC should replace 
these two variables. The second restriction is that TRDY can be excluded from the 
growth equation. Both the F and LR tests suggest that these restrictions are jointly 
valid. The result of imposing these restrictions is shown in column (3) of the table. It 
should be noted that the first of the two restrictions implies that changes in MCAP and 
BPY have the same effect on growth. Thus the source of the growth of the financial 
sector does not appear to affect the rate of economic growth.  Neither the validity of 
the restrictions nor the significance levels of any of the variables are affected by using 
a robust IV estimator, as was done by Azfar and Matheson (2003). 
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 III Conclusions 
 
This paper is presented as a contribution to the Law and Finance literature.  That 
literature sees the financial sector as an source of growth and legal institutions as a 
significant determinant of financial sector development.  We extend the contribution 
to this literature of Azfar and Matheson (2003).  These authors demonstrate that their 
measure of Market-Mobilised Capital (MMC) is a significant determinant of growth 
and is in turn influenced by legal institutions.  However, they (in common with much 
research in this field) do not consider the nature of the relationship between legal 
institutions and their measure of financial sector development (MMC).  They do not 
consider the underlying structural relationship between legal institutions and financial 
sector development.  It is the argument of this paper that the nature of this structural 
relationship has major implications for policy-makers. 
 
To demonstrate this we utilise the same, widely used, data set as Azfar and Matheson 
(2003).  We use a more general specification of the relationship between legal 
institutions and the extent of financial development and estimate it in the context of a 
system of equations which is estimated equation by equation.  This approach 
highlights the relevance of the specification of the relationships for policy-making. It 
also puts it in a context where it has already been shown that legal institutions have a 
significant impact on economic growth. 
 
The results differ from those implied by Azfar and Matheson (2003) in that the size of 
the capital market component of MMC is found to be strongly influenced by the 
interaction of investor protection laws with the quality of legal enforcement. This is 
an important result from the perspective of policy-making.  The implication of it is 
that for countries with low levels of enforcement focusing on improving investor 
protection laws does not necessarily contribute to increasing the size of the stock 
market (and hence growth). For such countries the main priority should be improved 
enforcement within the legal system and creditor protection.  Given the high 
correlation between the quality of law enforcement and the level of development, 
these are likely to be developing countries.  This cautions against concentrating on 
reform of commercial laws rather than developing the effectiveness of the legal 
system.  Our results also suggest that at high levels of enforcement there is little to be 
gained (in this context) from further improvements in the level of enforcement.  On 
the other hand, we confirm the other general qualitative results of Azfar and Matheson 
(2003) that: (1) the size of MMC positively affects growth; (2) this result is invariant 
to the relative contributions of the two components of MMC (i.e. the Modigliani and 
Miller capital structure irrelevance hypothesis holds in this context). 
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